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STATE-MILITARY RELATIONS IN BRAZIL

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A thesis submitted to the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.
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LAYTON GERALD DUNBAR. State-Military Relations in Brazil (Under the direction of ENRIQUE BALOYRA.).

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STATE - MILITARY RELATIONS
IN BRAZIL

by
Layton G. Dunbar

A Thesis submitted to the faculty of
The University of North Carolina at
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I. INTRODUCTION

A recent direction of political research on Latin America has been toward the recognition of the central role of the state as a political actor. This research has generally focused on the authoritarian regimes of Brazil, Argentina and Peru which have been variously characterized as modernizing authoritarian, bureaucratic authoritarian, and corporatist. Within these regimes the military has been viewed as the dominant component in a ruling technocratic alliance.¹ In the new statist perspective, the state itself is one of those components.

Discussions of the state quickly lapse into confusion over the precise definition of the term and the definitions of two related terms, government and regime. The state is broadly conceived to include a land, a people and a government, but the term's vague origins in antiquity and its imprecise popular usage have blurred its meaning even among scholars and this has diminished its utility.² The term today "commonly denotes no class of objects that can be identified exactly, and for the same reason it signifies no list of attributes which bears the sanction of common usage."³ Because the three terms are vague and are often used interchangeably, it is fruitless to seek a common denominator among the various usages, rather "the word must be defined more or less arbitrarily, to meet the exigencies of the system of jurisprudence or political philosophy in which it occurs."⁴

The Dictionary of Politics defines the state in terms of six

characteristics: territorial exclusivity; a consenting population; internal and external sovereignty; political institutions which sustain, preserve, and perpetuate it; effective control over population and territory; and continuity.⁵ No entry is listed for the term government; but in the definition given for the state, the Dictionary of Politics indicates that the government is the "political institutions . . . and the administrative apparatus which comprises the political system" Elsewhere it is defined as the "organized institutions of the political communities which are designated by the term state."⁶ The term regime is not defined in either of these sources but a definition can be derived from Juan Linz's discussion of the authoritarian regime, a term which he coined.⁷ Although he interchanges the three terms freely, his description of the authoritarian regime implies that regimes are classifications of governments according to their relationships with the governed. Thus, regimes are modes of government and he identifies three: democratic, totalitarian, and authoritarian.

Alfred Stepan, too, considers the state as

. . . something more than the government. It is the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive systems that attempt not only to structure relations between civil society and public authority but also to structure many crucial relationships within civil society as well.⁸

For the purpose here, it is important to determine how the military relates to the state. For Stepan, the military, as part of the coercive system, is a component of the state. He goes on to point out that the state is not monolithic and, in those cases where there are conflicts between components of the state, it is due to the struggles of different elites for control of all the component parts.

There are, however, other sources of conflict within the state apparatus. It must be recognized that the growth of the state in these

authoritarian regimes implies its differentiation from the military institution. Upon the inauguration of these regimes, the military institution and the military government are virtually indistinguishable, but the government gradually acquires an identity of its own and pursues policies which at times conflict with the goals of the military institution. This differentiation is an entirely natural and expected outcome since internal autonomy or sovereignty is one of the defining characteristics of the state. The state seeks to increase its internal autonomy by subordinating the other components in the alliance. In this process the military institution comes to resemble more and more the other societal groups which the state seeks to dominate. Thus, a military government is soon confronted with the same problem that confounded its civilian predecessor: how to develop a formula for state (rather than civil) supremacy over the military. The military is so closely identified with the imposition of an authoritarian regime that the military institution and the military government are easily seen to be synonymous. The subject of civil-military relations, assumed to be irrelevant, again becomes relevant.

The growth of authoritarian regimes in Brazil, Argentina, and Peru has been described as a consequence of the preponderant role of their military institutions. Studies of these regimes have described in detail the corporatist structures which have been manipulated by the state to control civilian groups. This corporatist system of control is usually seen as being directed toward the lower sectors of society to exclude them from the political system.⁹ Unexamined from the statist perspective have been the strategies employed by the state to subordinate and control the military.

The purpose of this thesis will be to apply the statist perspective to civil-military relations in Brazil and to analyze the state's

strategies of military control. The peculiar problem faced by the Brazilian state is how to maintain the unity and support of the military and at the same time to depoliticize its members in order to increase its own strength and autonomy. This dual strategy of military subordination exposes a fundamental contradiction between the necessity of the military's political support and its exclusion from politics. The method used in this thesis will be to first examine the unity and cohesion of the military since 1964 and to describe how the state has maintained the support of the military in the face of political diversity and fragmentation among its members. Next will be examined the state's attempts to insulate itself from military pressures by restructuring the linkages between itself and the military institution.

Models of State-Military Relations

In the literature of civil-military relations, a number of models have been constructed to describe the methods used by civilian governments to control their military institutions. These models describe structures and processes of civilian control. When the military rejects subordination to the civilian sector and enters the political arena, the discussion turns to praetorianism or models of military control. Both deal with relations between the military and the state leadership, but they are felt to be so different that different terms are used to describe the relationship in each instance. In the common experience of Latin America the term civil-military relations is inadequate to describe relations between the military and the state when the government is a military one or when it governs at the sufferance of the military. What is really the subject matter is state-military relations, a term which is more inclusive and more accurate in describing that relationship in Latin

America and especially in Brazil today.

There are three classic models of civilian control: the traditional or aristocratic, the liberal, and the penetration or communist model.¹⁰ In the traditional model, civilian supremacy is maintained because there is no differentiation between military and civilian elites and hence no conflict. There is no politicization of the military because it does not exist in any corporate sense. In the liberal model, there is a profound differentiation between the two. A stable relationship is maintained through the recognition that each sector has its own sphere that is off-limits to the other. In this model the military is totally depoliticized--politics is not its bailiwick--while the civilian sector is demilitarized. It is clear that our insistence at seeing "civil-military relations" in terms of civilian control by a civilian state is a product of this liberal perspective. The penetration model differs from the others in that the state actively seeks to politicize the military by imbuing it with the official ideology of the state.

Clearly none of these models describes the experience of Latin America with its ingrained patterns of militarism. As models themselves they have weaknesses which limit their utility. Being paradigms they are ideal cases and rarely fit any particular case. Another difficulty is that they are used to explain the failure of civilian control, that is, changes in the direction of military control rather than from military to civilian control. Thirdly, they are static models and do not indicate movement or tendencies toward other forms of control.

Alfred Stepan has described state-military relations in Brazil prior to 1964 by a fourth model which he calls the moderator.¹¹ In that role, in which the Brazilian army has operated since the founding of the republic, the army inherited the poder moderador, or moderating power, of

the emperor. He had the legitimate power to intercede in the nation's political affairs whenever he felt it necessary. After 1888 the army assumed this role and exercised it on numerous occasions each time returning to the barracks and returning power to a civilian government. In 1964 Stepan shows that there occurred a redefinition of boundaries when the army intervened and chose to retain political control. In the dichotomy of state-military relations between civilian control and military control, the moderator model describes neither but rather an informal arrangement for sharing control.

Eric Nordlinger has constructed a typology consisting of three variations of military control distinguished by the degree of intervention and their goals while in power.¹² At the lowest level of intervention are the moderators who limit their activity to occasional exercise of a veto over civilian politics in order to maintain the system intact. A higher level of intervention is exercised by the guardians who maintain a closer control over the government in order to effect low level changes in society but to keep the basic structure intact. Finally, the military ruler exercises near total dominance in politics in order to make significant changes in the political or economic system.

Having described an array of models, it remains to locate Brazil among them. Throughout the twentieth century until 1964 the Brazilian military acted as the moderator of Brazilian politics. Stepan documents eight instances between 1898 and 1964 in which the military intervened in its moderator role.¹³ In not all of these instances was the military coup successful, but when it was, the military withdrew and returned power to the civilians. This informal arrangement ended in 1964 when the military seized power and has refused to return it since. Its role changed from moderator to guardian or possibly ruler. It is difficult to

precisely locate the Brazilian regime in Nordlinger's typology today. The evidence of continuing purges and sharp cleavages within the military which will be examined here indicate that all three praetorian tendencies are represented there. The variation that best describes the regime at any particular time may only be that of its dominant faction. What may be clearer is the direction of change in Brazilian state-military relations. The description and analysis of those changes will constitute the bulk of this thesis.

NOTES

¹See Alfred Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil (New Haven: Yale University, 1973). Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1973) and Alfred Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in Contemporary Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

²George H. Sabine, "State," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1930, vol. 14, p. 328.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Walter J. Raymond, Dictionary of Politics (Lawrenceville, Virginia: Brunswick Publishing Co., 1978), pp. 657-59.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain" in Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology (New York: The Free Press, 1970), pp. 251-83.

⁸Stepan, The State and Society, p. xii.

⁹See particularly the essays in James M. Malloy, ed., Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977).

¹⁰Eric Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1977), pp. 10-19.

¹¹Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 62-66.

¹²Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics, pp. 21-27.

¹³Stepan, The Military in Politics, pp. 81-121.

II. UNITY AND FRAGMENTATION

The military which has ruled Brazil since 1964 is not a monolithic institution which provides unified support to government policy. Studies have shown that it was weakened by internal divisions before the 1964 revolution and since then during the administrations of each of the succeeding presidents. These divisions frequently threatened to break the outward unity of the military and in some cases necessitated abrupt policy changes to maintain that unity. So significant have these divisions been that military affairs has become a sub-speciality of Brazilian journalism. It would be worthwhile then to begin by investigating the problem of military unity by isolating that factor from the fourteen years of the regime's history. To determine how the government maintains a united military it is necessary to examine the sources of unity and disunity, to discover what factions exist, and to review the methods the government and military hierarchy use to insure unified support.

Throughout this discussion, the "military" and the "army" will appear to be used interchangeably. Clearly they are not since Brazil has a large and powerful navy and air force. Nevertheless the army is the dominant institution among the military services and has been the most active participant in politics. Although navy and air force officers participated in the imposition of the military regime in 1964 and have been involved in every one since, these services have not had the political influence of the army, being content with supporting the administration and its objectives.¹ The "problem of military unity" then is

a problem of all three military services and the Brazilian state but one which is centered around the army, and it is the army which will receive attention here.

Unity within the military is one of the highest values held by members of that institution. While democratic values hold that governments govern by the consent of the people, the Brazilian regime and military hierarchy recognizes that in the final analysis it governs by the consent of the military. In the absence of absolute hierarchical control, the regime must actively seek the unified support of its political base--the military. The theme of military unity is not an unconscious desire or necessity which is inferred from the words and actions of the highest officials. Rather, it is probably the most frequently articulated theme in speeches and writings of the senior personnel and political leaders.

As Alfred Stepan points out, the unity which was needed within the army to plan and execute the overthrow of Goulart in 1964 was a great deal less than that required to support a military regime for an undetermined number of years.² The emphasis on institutional unity clearly runs throughout the regime's history. A senior general who participated in the 1964 coup stated:

Military unity is extremely important. Only if the military is split will there be a civil war. The optimum is if we have unity and are on the right course. But the most fundamental thing is to stay unified.³

One can easily appreciate the importance of unity even in a theoretical formulation. A brief review of the history of the regime since 1964 shows that this quality has also been one of the most lacking within the institution; hence the frequent calls for it. At times it seems that no speech by a military officer or the president is complete without

raising the flag of unity and saluting. The degree to which this value has been internalized can be seen in the circumstances surrounding the recent, highly publicized dismissals of two senior generals for essentially political reasons.

When General Silvio Frota was fired by President Geisel on October 12, 1977, ending his military career and his presidential hopes, he asserted nevertheless that he left voluntarily in order to prevent any division within the army.⁴ After the chief of the military household and national security council resigned in protest over the Frota affair, his successor stated that if there were "possible disagreements and discords" within the Brazilian army, "the principle of unity remains."⁵ One of the most hard-line officers within the army, General Ednardo D'Avila Melo, who was fired as a result of a series of torture deaths which occurred within his military jurisdiction, refused to publicly challenge the action preferring instead to emphasize the discipline and hierarchy-consciousness of the army.⁶

Institutional unity is thus viewed within the Brazilian military as an absolute imperative for continued regime viability. But beyond any political purpose, a cohesive army is necessary for the viability and effectiveness of the institution itself. Military unity is held in such high value in itself that individuals frequently subordinate their personal beliefs and ambitions to insure it. Only in exceptional instances in the history of the regime have individuals in the military publicly expressed ideas or acted in opposition to the government. Those who have done so, have suffered consequences which will be seen below.

Sources of Unity

In an analysis of military unity it would be appropriate to

begin by reviewing existing literature to determine the sources of unity, that is, the issues on which there is general agreement or the values which soldiers hold in common and the source of those values. Since military intervention requires a fairly high level of institutional cohesion and common purpose, the theories which have been offered to explain military coups are helpful in explaining military unity. The explanations of military coups differ in their emphasis on causative factors; some emphasize psychological characteristics of military personnel, others the peculiarities of the military institution, the surrounding society and military links with it, or even foreign relations. These explanations may be grossly categorized into internal and external determinants.⁷

The most internal of the explanations are those which emphasize the psychology of the soldier. The soldier is thought to possess certain personal qualities which set him apart from the civilian population. He is expected to demonstrate qualities of bravery, discipline, obedience, self-denial, austerity, honesty, political impartiality, and dedication to the public interest.⁸ The so-called "military virtues" are surely no more prevalent in the military than elsewhere but they are widely perceived to be attributes of military service and this perception imparts a sense of cohesion, uniqueness and moral superiority to its members.

The military virtues, as well as other psychological traits of soldiers in the Brazilian army, are inculcated by an intensive process of socialization which often begins at the age of twelve when many future officers enter military high schools in preparation for entrance into the formal officer career pattern.⁹ When the new officer graduates from the military academy and is commissioned, he is hardly a newcomer to military life since he has already spent up to eight years of his life in a

closed military environment. Throughout his career he remains somewhat insulated from civilian society and his life revolves largely around his comrades and his organization to a degree unmatched among civilians.

Besides this almost incidental process of socialization, the military institution actively seeks to mold an officer's attitudes by subjecting him to an extensive system of professional education and training throughout his career. The first phase of this formal training consists of four years at the Military Academy at Agulhas Negras (AMAN). Following commissioning the officer must follow a rigid program of schooling to qualify for each succeeding promotion. After approximately ten years service, he attends the nine-month long Officers Improvement School (EsAO), the equivalent of U.S. Army Advanced Courses. As a major or lieutenant colonel, if he is among the 25% of those eligible who pass stiff qualifying examinations, he attends the three-year long Army Command and General Staff School (ECEME). Finally, as a colonel, he would hope to be selected for the year-long Superior War College (ESG).¹⁰

These courses form the core program of officer education which is closely tied to promotions and professional development. The Brazilian army also conducts a wide range of technical and specialty courses for its members. Over 100 courses are conducted for officers alone ranging from basic parachuting to the equivalent of a masters degree in nuclear engineering.¹¹ While this training is normally for specific military skills it further serves to reinforce the proficiency and overall sense of capability of those who receive it.

One of the products of the military educational system and one of the most important factors in military cohesion in the last twenty years has been the National Security Doctrine. Developed in the Superior War College (ESG) by a group of military intellectuals who have since

played a significant role in Brazilian politics, it has been disseminated throughout the officer corps by its integration into each level of officer schooling. The influence of the ESG and the doctrine it has espoused has been recognized and commented upon by all contemporary students of the Brazilian military. Schneider and Stepan detail the creation of the school in 1949, the development of its ideology, the National Security Doctrine, and the role of both in the overthrow of Goulart and the assumption of military rule.¹²

The doctrine itself has described the integration of development and national security as "two complementary, although distinct sides of the exercise of National Power."¹³ It is no coincidence that the review magazine published by the ESG is entitled "Security and Development." The doctrine perhaps qualifies as the "mentality" which Juan Linz found typical of authoritarian regimes rather than a fully articulated ideology.¹⁴ It is not expressed succinctly in any tract but it has been progressively expressed over the years in a series of national goals adopted by the ESG. These goals are National Integration, Sovereignty, Development-Progress-National Prosperity, Democracy, Territorial Integrity, and Social Peace.¹⁵

A civilian graduate of the ESG applied the technique of content analysis to President Médici's speeches in order to rank the national goals according to the emphasis they received. They were thus ranked in order: National Prosperity, Social Peace, National Integration, Democracy, Sovereignty, International Prestige, and Territorial Integrity.¹⁶ Although this analysis is based upon speeches made from 1968-73 and reflected concerns of that period, the themes still permeate presidential speeches. A more extensive content analysis covering the period 1964-1975 lists development (economic, political, and social in that order)

as the most common theme with national prestige second.¹⁷

Another product of the military education system and indirectly of the National Security Doctrine is an intense nationalism among soldiers. Brazil has always been a country which had high expectations for itself. This nationalism takes its place neatly among the pantheon of military virtues and becomes chauvinistic pride raised to the level of ideology. The military sees itself as the repository of national pride and its chauvinism produces an extreme sensitivity to affronts to the national dignity and the ready perception of threats from external sources.

The recent disputes with the United States over the purchase of nuclear power plants for the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States' emphasis on human rights were widely seen as insults to national dignity as well as obstacles to the future development and greatness of Brazil.¹⁸ President Geisel reacted by scrapping several bilateral security treaties and gained increased support from the military at a time when it had been weak.¹⁹ Likewise, the encouragement given to its national arms industry is perhaps as much a product of institutional and national pride as it is for the expressed reasons of military independence and increased exports.

The U.S. Army has perhaps had a closer continuing relationship with the Brazilian army than with any Western army except those of NATO countries. Unique in this regard has been the permanent liaison offices maintained by the Brazilian army at the Army Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas and at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. These liaison offices were withdrawn by the Brazilian government in the aftermath of the human rights dispute.²⁰ Brazilian sensibilities were similarly offended in 1978 when the United States reduced

the rank of its military attache to Brasilia from brigadier general to colonel. Although there was no political significance attached to the move by the U.S.--it was the result of a Congressionally mandated reduction in general officer strength--Brazil retaliated by replacing its attache in Washington, a general, with a colonel. At this writing a new U.S. attache, a general, is preparing to leave for Brazil and Brazil is expected to assign a general to its Washington embassy.²¹

A further outcome of the socialization process and the training and education system is a strong sense of corporate identity and professionalism. Although some have felt that increased professionalism in third world militaries would lead to their depoliticization,²² Stepan demonstrates that increased professionalism in the Brazilian army has led to a greater feeling of corporateness and self-confidence which encouraged political intervention and continuing military rule. His "New Professionalism" describes this consequence of the Brazilian military education system for Brazilian politics.²³

Some see corporate self-interest as the primary motivation for military intervention in politics. In Brazil, the military felt threatened by President João Goulart's conciliatory attitude toward the instigators of a naval mutiny,--a move which appeared to threaten military discipline and respect for hierarchy and thus undermine the very foundation of the institution. They further felt threatened by Cuban subversion. They saw in the Cuban revolutionary model a threat to the integrity and survival of their own institution.²⁴ Even today with the military stronger than ever and with no serious external threats, developments in neighboring countries are followed closely and taken seriously. A month after receiving reports of Cuban military advisors arriving in Guyana,²⁵ the army announced plans to station an infantry company near the Surinam

border, thereby doubling infantry strength in that region.²⁶

José Nun has emphasized the middle class orientation of the Latin American military institutions in explaining their political intervention and rule.²⁷ He saw intervention as the outcome of the military's alliance with a middle class that was too fragmented to effectively articulate its own interests. He pointed to the middle class origins of the officer corps and saw their intervention as a response to threats to those interests. Thus he too sees intervention as rooted in corporate self-interest, but he sees their corporate interests coinciding with those of the middle classes, not because the military is their tool, but because they are middle class themselves.

Stepan documented the middle class origins of the Brazilian officer corps through his investigation into the recruitment patterns of the military academy. Their middle class values and economic concerns are seen repeatedly in their concern for maintaining their standard of living in the face of continuing inflation and at times detrimental government economic policies. When President Geisel tried to impose a surtax on gasoline in order to reduce consumption, the military reportedly communicated its disapproval because of the hardship it would cause to their middle class salary levels, thereby influencing Geisel to drop the scheme.

Military cohesion and political activity is sometimes attributed to linkages with foreign or international groups. Proponents of these views often ascribe the anti-communist or pro-United States attitudes to the effects of United States' military assistance.²⁸ The experiences of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) in Italy during World War II and its leaders' close association with the U.S. military in the Italian campaign is often thought to have influenced the leaders of the 1964 coup.

But each year since the Febistas have dwindled in number. At the beginning of 1977 only fifty-nine remained on active duty. The United States influence is also thought to persist through the training program of the Military Assistance Program and the International Military Education and Training Program, both components of the United States Security Assistance. Over 165 Brazilian army officers currently on active duty have attended U.S. military schools in the United States or Canal Zone, a small percentage of the 5600 total officers; but forty of the 128 army generals on active duty have attended a U.S. school.²⁹ Despite the evidence of a close and long-standing relationship with the U.S. military, its influence on the political attitudes of the Brazilian officer remains problematical.³⁰

It is clear that there are strong forces for institutional cohesion exerted continually upon the military officer. He comes from the same social and economic background as his peers. He lives in a country which is fiercely proud and he works within an institution which sees itself as the embodiment of that pride. His long training and indoctrination increases the institution's natural cohesion while the National Security Doctrine provides a theoretical framework for his political attitudes. But it is the pervasive dedication to hierarchy and discipline which is the glue that holds the military together and keeps it supportive of the state.

Fragmentation

The Brazilian soldier is not completely socialized by his military experiences and training. He is not a martinet. And since the army is not perfectly disciplined by its hierarchy, it does not provide a unified base of support to the government on policy questions. At the time

of the most delicately forged unity in Brazilian military history when a consensus was achieved to overthrow the constitutional president, a contemporary journalist said,

The interests, opinions, points of view, and political passions which circulate in civil society and which stir up its diverse factions also penetrate the military, sensitizing the mass of officers at various grades to differing degrees.³¹

The purpose of the next few pages is to briefly review those interests, opinions, points of view, and passions on which substantial portions of the military disagree. The consequences of these differences--cleavages and factions within the military--will be discussed in the next section.

If there is a solid consensus on national goals as expressed in the National Security Doctrine, there is less agreement on policies to achieve those goals. Economic development is a tenet of the doctrine, but the strategy employed to achieve it is a continuing source of dispute. The abrupt change in national economic strategy made by the military after 1964 has not been seriously questioned since the early purges of the regime, but differences persist in the emphasis given several facets of the new strategy. Industrialization continues to be the preferred route to development but the overall strategy has been modified. Domestic industry, previously the centerpiece of economic development in the import substitution strategy, remains an object of great concern. From 1964 on, domestic industry has been propelled by a combination of state assistance and foreign capital. Trade policy has seen the greatest changes in emphasis. The export sector, deemphasized under Goulart and the previous civilian presidents, has been elevated to leading sector status. Brazil has made a concerted effort to expand and diversify exports through a "massive mercantile assault on world markets" to seek new outlets for its products.³² The private sector, especially foreign

capital, has played a greater role in investment and public sector efforts have been directed toward expansion and development of the country's infrastructure.³³

These policies have not been without their critics even in the military. Although the vagaries of economic policy may not be high on the list of concerns of the average officer, he is continually cajoled by civilian economic interests who curry his favor and support. These civilian interests may be helped or hurt by the government's policy toward state enterprise and multi-national corporations and seek allies in the military much as lobbyists in the U.S. Congress. These officers become sensitized to economic issues by the supplications of the civilian interests and their own nationalism when they sense that one policy may be more or less advantageous to Brazil.

The growth of the public sector in Brazil, however, is more than an ideological commitment to state enterprise. In line with the National Security Doctrine, an additional justification for national ownership of industry is that critical industry must be controlled by the state to insure its support of and integration into the development program and to control industries critical to national security. President Figueredo said soon after being selected as the presidential candidate that he planned to "transfer to private hands as many state-owned enterprises as possible, without exposing the national security."³⁴

A criticism frequently leveled against the regime has been the uneven distribution of wealth and the government's apparent insensitivity to it. The economic strategies adopted have emphasized aggregate growth which has disproportionately benefitted the middle and upper sectors. Critics have called this strategy growth without development and a strictly economic view of development. Some outspoken generals have recognized

the inequalities and have questioned the logic of economic development if it does not benefit the people. The Second Army Commander, General Dilermando Gomes recently stated that there was no point in having economic development if it did not make people happy.³⁵ The oft-quoted statement by President Médici shows that even the president is not ignorant of that criticism: "Brazil is doing well, but the people are doing poorly." It is easy to overstate the significance of disagreements over economic policy. The fact is that the consensus on the development goal effectively dominates disagreements over short-term strategies.

Although the security aspect of the National Security Doctrine is widely understood to mean internal rather than external security, there is no consensus over the aggressiveness with which the goal is to be pursued. The range of opinion over the proper level of anti-subversive tactics to be followed by the government might be characterized as stern to harsh. Each president has attempted to reduce the level of repression, but all except Geisel have felt it necessary to abandon the attempt in the face of worsening political unrest and terrorism and the pressures from within the military for tougher action. President Geisel's announced policy of distensão which was to ease the authoritarian controls on political activity was in that respect similar to the "Humanization" program of Costa e Silva and the similar intentions but unnamed programs of Castello Branco and Médici. Geisel, however, was not faced with the political unrest that the other presidents experienced and was able to resist the elements in the military who favored the continuation of repressive government tactics.

Likewise the national goal of democracy is not questioned, but it apparently conjures up different images in the military. Even if the boundary change of 1964 indicated that the military did not plan to

return to the barracks, many individuals within the military felt that it should. Redemocratization was the original intention of Castello Branco but he was forced to postpone civilian rule because of the pressures of those who wanted to retain power or more thoroughly purge the civilian system.³⁶ Over the years a number of Brazilian generals have gained a great deal of publicity by their demands for an immediate return to civilian rule. The succession crisis of 1978 presented the confusing picture of all factions calling for a return to civilian rule but disagreeing over the speed with which to make the return and what civilian rule really meant.

The most divisive single issue within the military is undoubtedly the process of presidential succession. The orderly transfer of power is a problem for every authoritarian regime and in Brazil it is the event which most deepens the existing cleavages and brings them out into the open. Such cleavages are effectively papered over at other times except when a disgruntled officer occasionally chooses to publicly denounce a government plan or policy. Presidential succession becomes the battlefield on which these hidden disputes are played out. If the groups within the army accept the over-riding need for institutional unity and accept or acquiesce in the regime's policies, it is only by controlling or influencing the selection of the next president that they can influence the future policy of the government.

Factionalism

A diversity of political opinion in the military is thought to be perfectly natural and acceptable in a system of liberal civil-military relations and under the concept of the citizen-soldier, but this diversity is not reflected in factions which align themselves for or against

particular policies. Officers may disagree over any number of issues, but the disagreements themselves are significant only to the extent that like-minded officers join with them to influence policy. The sources of fragmentation reviewed earlier are important only when factions rise around them.

First it is important to understand what Brazilian military factions are not. While a particular individual may seem to represent a faction or be its spokesman, the faction itself is not organized around his personality. The deeply bureaucratized nature of the army and its acceptance of institutionalized rules and regulations limits the discretionary power of its leaders and has prevented the rise of a personalistic leader. There is, in fact, a deep seated aversion to personalist leadership, probably because it would represent a degree of independence from the institution. The personalist leader would gain political support through personal loyalty rather than solely from his position in the institutional hierarchy. This was the greatest personal criticism leveled against President Geisel, anything but a charismatic leader, during the early maneuvering for the selection of his successor. When he insisted on making the selection personally without the advice of the military he was accused of megalomania and personalism--code words for his independence and disregard of military opinions.

Since 1964 the most significant cleavage has been between two groups known as the Sorbonnists and the hard-liners.³⁷ Although Schneider has discerned the existence in 1964 of ten groups with essentially different attitudes toward the 1964 coup,³⁸ since then the common view has been of two dichotomous groups contending for power and influence. The view of a strict dichotomy may be an oversimplification of the outcome of a much more complex play of issues and attitudes and

bureaucratic politics.

The Sorbonnists described in the literature are easily distinguished by a series of unique career experiences which they have in common. Stepan has analyzed these experiences and compared the frequency with which they occurred among the Sorbonne group, the generals associated with João Goulart and the rest of the Brazilian army generals. The table below summarizes his findings.³⁹

TABLE 1
CAREER EXPERIENCES OF MILITARY FACTIONS IN 1964

	Sorbonnist	Pro-Goulart	Un-identified
veterans of FEB	60%	25%	30%
graduate of ESG	90%	50%	62%
on staff of ESG	70%	18%	13%
graduated 1st in class	100%	20%	33%
attended foreign military school	100%	20%	24%

Their international experience, acquaintance with the United States and academic and intellectual experiences led the Sorbonnists to feel dissatisfied with the state of Brazilian political and economic development and hence to develop a program for world power status,--the National Security Doctrine reviewed earlier. At the same time their education and governmental experiences and the acquaintances made with civilian intellectuals and governmental officials at the ESG encouraged them to take a more reformist view of government and to make a clearer distinction between subversives and nationalist reformers.⁴⁰ Despite the clarity of the distinction made by their common experiences, the Sorbonnists were best known by the company they kept. The names of Castello Branco, Golbery, Ernesto Geisel and Cordeiro de Farias were closely linked to the group as it developed in the 1950's. The current factional

identification of a Brazilian officer is often best made by virtue of his association with these or other well known Sorbonnists.

If the Sorbonnists are distinguished by their common experiences and ideology, the same is not necessarily true of the officers who came to oppose many of their policies, the so-called hard-liners. The hard-line faction consisted more of field commanders who had less experience on high level staffs and in school assignments. They were on the whole younger than the Sorbonnists and were inclined to take a more drastic view of restructuring Brazilian politics and were "given to stereotyped perceptions and black and white interpretations."⁴¹ The hard-line is difficult to define or describe because they did not have an articulated program as did the Sorbonnists nor did they have effective spokesmen for their points of view. Schneider suggests that "it may be helpful to consider the hard line as much as a state of spirit which could be accentuated by the course of events as a relatively small hard-core faction which under certain circumstances strikes a responsive chord in a broader spectrum of the military."⁴² Equally significant is that the broader spectrum was probably dominant, factionally neutral, and content to respect the leadership and discipline of their hierarchical superiors.

The dimensions of this factionalization and the relative strengths of the factions are revealed by their contention over presidential succession and over governmental policies toward political dissent. The coincidence of events around which the military coalesced in 1964 soon passed, and the temporary military unity quickly degenerated into what has been called the "disaggregation of the Revolution."⁴³ The choice of the moderate Armed Forces Chief of Staff, General Castello Branco, was itself a compromise among military factions. Besides being a well-respected military leader in his own right with his own loyal following

of Sorbonnists, he was acceptable to the other poles of military opinion in 1964. His reputation for political moderation gave him the support of legalists and moderates like himself who desired an eventual return to civilian rule while his early support and leadership of the coup gave him the support of the hard-liners who wanted at least an open-ended military rule.

Such a fragile unity could not be maintained for long. The issue of redemocratization very nearly generated a consolidating coup of the hard-liners in 1965. With a decline of public support and an increasing dissatisfaction with government policies among the hard-liners, Castello Branco was obliged to take a sharp authoritarian turn. The price he had to pay for his continuation in power was the issuance of Institutional Act Number Two which greatly increased the arbitrary powers of the president in the political field. Furthermore, instead of returning political power to civilians in the tradition of the poder moderador he reached an implicit understanding with the hard-liners that he would be succeeded in 1967 by his War Minister, the hard-line General Costa e Silva.⁴⁴

Costa e Silva's accession to the presidency was not accompanied by a great deal of controversy within the military. The hard-liners were apparently satisfied by the 1965 selection and factional disputes were attenuated. Since Castello Branco was unable to control his own succession, he attempted to institutionalize his policies by incorporating them into a vast quantity of decree laws. It is reported that 115 decrees were issued in a three day period in February, three weeks from the day Costa e Silva was to take office.⁴⁵ Thus, despite sharp differences, the Sorbonnists and hard-liners reached an uneasy accommodation that lasted through the presidency of Costa e Silva.

The working arrangement came unglued with the incapacitation of

Costa e Silva by a cerebral hemorrhage and subsequent rule by military junta. The experiences of the army during five years of military rule had demonstrated the fragility of military unity and the dangers inherent in presidential succession. It was with a great deal of care that the institution established a mechanism for the selection of the next president. The solution to the succession question on that occasion came after polling all 118 generals on active duty for their choices. The choice of the younger hard-liners was the Minister of the Interior, General Albuquerque Lima, while the choice of the Sorbonnists was General Orlando Geisel. Each of these was anathema to the other faction so the senior generals of the High Command decided to attempt a compromise between the two factions. The solution was to select the Third Army commander, General Garrastazu Médici, an officer with close personal links with Costa e Silva and who had also worked closely with the Sorbonnists. The factions were to be further mollified by naming Orlando Geisel to the War Ministry, the hard-line Admiral Rademaker to the vice-presidency, and by dividing up lesser positions and cabinet offices between the factions. It was because of the 1968 election that the Army High Command gained the reputation of being the only effective political party in Brazil.⁴⁶

The second most visible source of differences between the factions is their attitude toward political dissent and the government's response to it. The administration of Médici had to deal with the rise of urban terrorism and guerrilla warfare. The threat to the regime posed by the urban guerrillas strengthened unity within the military and reduced the cleavages somewhat. While Médici embarked on his "Great Brazil" development program, the army assumed command of the counter-guerrilla campaign. The instruments of the campaign were the intelligence and police forces created and centralized since 1964.

These apparatuses became the locus of factional activity during the anti-terrorist campaign. The national intelligence organization was the National Intelligence Service (Serviço Nacional de Informações, SNI), organized in 1964 during Castello Branco's presidency. Its first chief, General Golbery do Couto e Silva, had been and remains closely associated with the ESG and the Sorbonne Group.⁴⁷ The SNI was a national organ under the supervision of the National Security Council and under the direct control of the president. The army agency most involved in the campaign was the Army Intelligence Center (Centro de Informações do Exército, CIEX) which had been organized in 1969 by Costa e Silva. The CIEX was directly under the supervision of the Minister of the Army and dealt more with tactical intelligence for the use of army units in their operations. The CIEX was credited with eliminating the two best known leaders among the urban guerrillas, Carlos Marighela and Carlos Lamarca.

As the guerrilla threat subsided, the CIEX continued to grow in size and activity. It came to be controlled by the more hard-line officers and was recently censured by President Geisel for the systematic use of torture.⁴⁸ The information that had come forth on the CIEX is only what the government wishes to be known. It has only released or leaked the information to discredit it and its hard-line backers, especially General Silvio Frota who as Army Minister was responsible for its activities. This dispute enables us to see another manifestation of the historical hard-line/Sorbonnist split as it has evolved today. In effect, the two intelligence agencies were factional rivals and provided each faction with its own independent intelligence and repressive apparatus.

The evolution of the Sorbonne/hard-line dichotomy can be traced in the success of the Sorbonnists in controlling the presidential

succession. With the exception of Costa e Silva and Médici, the Brazilian military presidents have been of the Sorbonne faction. Médici, seen earlier as a compromise figure, has credentials from both groups. Table 2 shows selected military assignments and duties of each of the military presidents and General Golbery. Except for Costa e Silva, the presidents have had multiple links to General Golbery and the SNI and have had previous political/administrative assignments in addition to their own military qualifications. The current president, João Figueiredo, is in fact the quintessential Sorbonnist, having worked personally for Golbery, Médici and Geisel and having headed the SNI.

Another perspective on the historical split has been provided by a retired Brazilian navy captain, Dalmo Honaisen. Honaisen himself was a victim of the hard-line anti-subversive campaign when he was involuntarily retired in 1969 under the authority of Institutional Act Number Five. Honaisen has characterized the historical factions as greens and yellows, from the colors of the Brazilian flag. The greens are the Sorbonnists, or Castellistas or moderates, while the yellows are the hard-liners or anti-Sorbonnists. Since the Médici administration, the yellows have not been as successful as the greens in military politics. Honaisen sees Institutional Act Number Five of 1968 and Decree 447, which severely restricted academic freedom, as the greatest victories of the hard-liners since the election of Costa e Silva. Other than these successes, he feels they have suffered many setbacks, the most recent being the firing of the Army Minister, General Silvio Frota, in September of 1977. The greens on the other hand have controlled the presidency since Médici, and Honaisen feels they will continue to do so.⁴⁹

The discussion of military factions since 1964 has so far dealt only with the Sorbonne/hard-line dichotomy. The presidential succession

TABLE 2. MILITARY ASSIGNMENTS OF BRAZILIAN PRESIDENTS

	Pre-64	Mar 64-Mar 67	Mar 67-Aug 69	Oct 69-Mar 74	Mar 74-Mar 79	Mar 79-
Golbery	staff of ESG chief/CSN staff Army G 3	Castello Branco chief/SNI	Costa e Silva Tribunal of accounts	Médici Pres./Dow Chemical	Geisel chief/civil household	Figueiredo chief/civil household
Castello Branco	FEB commandant/ECEME Cdr/4th Army DOI Armed Forces C/S	President				
Costa e Silva	War Minister	War Minister	President			
Médici	C/S to Costa e Silva in 3d MR	attache to U.S. Cdr/3d MR	Chief/SNI Cdr/3d Army	President		
Geisel	staff of CSN under Golbery, mil aide to Pres, Pres of refinery, mil rep to Natl petrol council, Army G 2	chief/military household	STM	Pres/ PETROBRAS	President	
Figueiredo	assigned to Army G3 under Golbery ECEME staff	SNI chief in Rio, police chief in Sao Paulo, SNI staff under Golbery	C/S to Médici at 3d Army	chief/military household	chief/SNI	President

SOURCE: various sources, especially Schneider, The Political System of Brazil; issues of Veja magazine; and O Estado de São Paulo.

of 1978-79 saw the emergence of a handful of splinter factions which joined a near-public debate on a closed process. If the earlier lines were drawn over government policy toward subversion, the 78 succession debate was centered on the return to democratic or at least civilian rule. Dalmo Honaisen is the spokesman for the Democratic Revolutionary Movement (MRD), a group which he claims follows the true principles of Castello Branco. Honaisen feels that those associated with the Geisel administration, although having impeccable Sorbonnist credentials, have deviated from Castello Branco's commitment to democracy and social justice. The purpose of the MRD, as explained by Honaisen, is to educate the public and the military and to see the revolution return to its original objectives: social justice and the restoration and improvement of democracy. To accomplish these goals the MRD feels that the return to democracy should be initiated by the reformulation of political parties and the revitalization of congress. The congress, rather than a constituent assembly, should then draft a new constitution.⁵⁰

Another faction dissatisfied with continuing military rule is a group of colonels centered in the Vila Militar, the large army installation in Rio de Janeiro, who call themselves the Military Democratic Constitutional Movement (MMDC). This group, which reportedly consists of 110 colonels in command of troops, is calling for the election of a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution and a subsequent return to democracy. Little else is known of the membership of this faction since their activity risks a violation of military regulations. They obviously desire to remain anonymous since there were press reports that the SNI was investigating the group.⁵¹ What information was available is suspect since 110 colonels in command of troops (that is, brigade commanders) would be more than exist even in the U.S. Army.

On the other side of the democratic movement is an organization called the Popular Movement for the Defense of the Revolution (MPDR) organized in March, 1977. Created by three retired generals who were well-known hard-liners while on active duty, the program of the MPDR includes "a cleansing of the nation of subversives, a harmonious solution to succession with the nomination of either a general or a 'civilian trusted by the revolution.'" They further believe that the economy must be freed from state control.⁵²

Table 3 is an attempt to locate these factions within the military spectrum of opinion by summarizing their opinions on the more controversial issues. The order from left to right is an approximation of their location by that familiar standard. Here should be reiterated all the usual caveats on the failings of political labels, but left-right labels do have the advantages of convenience and familiarity. The basis for this order is primarily their attitudes on subversion; moving to the right on the chart one encounters a clearer perception of danger from subversion and support for harsher measures toward it. This same order also sees decreasing support for state industry and foreign capital. Their attitudes toward civilian rule do not fit the scheme neatly since they all agree on redemocratization but favor different paths toward it. In some cases their support of redemocratization is better interpreted as opposition to President Geisel and his method of selecting his successor than as a commitment to democracy.

The enumeration of a handful of factions, of course, does not put in perspective their relative significance. They were essentially ad hoc organizations created to influence the 78 succession. While they articulated in varying degree a comprehensive political program, they were explicit in their desire for an end to Sorbonnist control of the presidency.

TABLE 3. MILITARY FACTIONS DURING 1978-79 SUCCESSION

	MMDC	MRD	GREENS	YELLOWS	MPDR
Subversion	"spectrum of communism will only be exorcised by a return to complete democracy; there is no subversion only a genuine desire for democracy"	"the revolution must not be afraid to go out on the streets, universities, factories to conquer with revolutionary doctrine."	government policy of slow relaxation of anti-subversive activities	continued vigilance and military operations against subversives	"a cleansing of the nation of subversives"
Civilian Rule/re-democratization	immediate return to the barracks by the army and election of a constituent assembly to draft new constitution	favors opening of political parties and drafting of new constitution by Congress	slow return to civilian rule following institutional changes in political system, target 1985	traditionally opposed but no firm opinion articulated	presidency to be occupied by general or civilian trusted by the military
State industry	unk	probably for	for	increasingly opposed	strongly opposed
Foreign capital	unk	probably for	for	opposed	opposed

TABLE 3. MILITARY FACTIONS (Continued)

	MMDC	MRD	GREENS	YELLOWs	MPDR
Civilian supporters	unk	unk	technocrats, loyal politicians, banking interests	nationalists, native businessmen	native business elements
Military supporters	110 active duty colonels centered in Rio	unk	higher level staffs, SNI, officers linked to Castello Branco, Médici, and Geisel	army troop commands, CIEEX, Army Ministry, officers linked to Costa e Silva	unk
Spokesmen	unk	Dalmo Honaisen	Geisel, Figueiredo	Silvio Frota, Jayme Portella Euler Bentes Monteiro	Silvio Heck Grun Moss, Odílio Denys
Saints	Castello Branco	Castello Branco	Castello Branco, Golbery do Couto e Silva, Médici	Costa e Silva, Rademaker, Albuquerque Lima	unk

SOURCE: Latin America Political Report, O Estado de São Paulo, Veja.

Their strength and support in the military is difficult to determine because of their secrecy, but what is clearly significant is their existence as spokesmen for dissident opinion under a government that insists on military unity.

The historical division in the army between the Sorbonnists and the hard-liners may be inadequate to describe military factionalization today. The Sorbonnists (Castellistas, greens, moderates, or whatever term is used to describe them) were relatively easy to identify in the early years of the military regime because of their unique career experiences. These experiences are no longer unique to any clique. The veterans of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force still on active duty continue to dwindle in numbers. The National Security Doctrine pervades the military education system from the Military Academy to the Superior War College. There is a clear linkage of the '64 Sorbonnists to the current president, but today the distinguishing characteristic of that faction is less their career experiences and ideology than their close association with other Sorbonnists. Thus, they have come to resemble a clique more than an issue or personality-oriented faction.

It is opposition to this insulated military elite which defines the military opposition today. Many of those in opposition to Geisel and Figueiredo were well-known hard-liners in the 1960's, but opposition to the Sorbonne elite is no longer limited to the traditional hard-liner faction. Some regard themselves as true Sorbonnists and struggle over the ghost of Castello Branco while others continue their long opposition to Sorbonnist policy. This wide spectrum has reacted to Geisel's insulation from the military and his lack of responsiveness by coalescing into a united opposition calling for redemocratization, in other words, an end to Sorbonnist presidents.

State Tactics of Control

The Brazilian state has not been a passive observer of the struggles of the various factions. The state has been at once the prize for the victorious faction and an active participant in the struggle as the president and others in positions of authority have used their administrative, judicial, and persuasive powers to maintain the support of friendly elements and to gain the support, or at least neutralize the opposition, of contrary elements within the army. Broadly speaking, one can divide the state's tactics of control into two categories: tactics of consensus and co-optation, and tactics of coercion. Despite the pressures of military rule, the Brazilian army has not ceased to be a professional institution, i.e., it is administered by rules and regulations and a hierarchy which is subject to those same rules. Nevertheless, there remains a great deal of discretionary power available to the president with which he can control people and events within the institution.

After the coup of 1964, the military bestowed on itself a substantial increase in spending. Between the years 1963 and 1973, the size of the armed forces grew at a rate 50% faster than the average for Latin America, and the rate of increase of military expenditures was greater than the rate of the growth of the GNP, a statistic which was reversed for Latin America as a whole.⁵³ Pay raises were granted which more than compensated for the erosion of purchasing power from inflation. Opportunities for promotion were expanded in 1968 by a decree which increased the rank structure within the army. The authorization for major general was increased from 23 to 25, for brigadier general from 48 to 51, for colonel from 340 to 353, for lieutenant colonel from 665 to 700, for major from 1345 to 1423, for captain from 2345 to 2481, and for first lieutenant

from 1463 to 1688.⁵⁴

An increase in positions available means nothing to an officer unless he is selected for promotion and it is here that the state has exercised its discretionary power most effectively. Promotions through the grade of colonel are the responsibility of the Army Minister. Because of the large number of officers eligible for promotion each year, the selection process is conducted by boards and committees which must rely on the qualifications and performance records contained in the individual officer's personnel file. Promotions to the lower and intermediate ranks are therefore based on relatively objective standards and are conducted in an impersonal manner.

The promotion of officers to the rank of general and to higher grades of general is a responsibility of the Army High Command (Appendix 3). The eleven four-star generals constituting the High Command sit as a committee chaired by the Army Minister to consider those eligible for promotion. Since each rank is limited by law, promotions are made only as sitting generals retire or otherwise vacate the position. By tradition, most promotions to general occur on March 31, the anniversary of the 1964 coup, and therefore tenure expires on that date leading to another round of promotions. Of those who meet the eligibility requirements, the High Command may select for promotion a number of officers equal to twice the number of positions available plus one. This list is then submitted to the president who selects those to be promoted.⁵⁵ Although the list composed by the High Command is arranged in a priority sequence, the president is in no way bound by their priority. It is well accepted that the president may choose to promote or not to promote anyone on the list, but an officer on the list who is not promoted while one below him is usually asks for immediate retirement. One can see that over

the years the president is able to significantly influence the character of active duty generals especially when one considers that he also promotes and appoints members of the High Command.

Stepan showed that the politicization of army promotions during Goulart's presidency was one factor generating military discontent. One would expect that after the 1964 coup the emphasis would return to strictly professional criteria such as military schooling and duty performance. In 1966 Castello Branco was able to promote seven new four-star generals and nine new three-star generals, an unusually large number at one time because a reduction in retirement benefits caused a flood of retirements.⁵⁶ In these promotions, Castello Branco passed over many hard-liners and supporters of former Guanabara governor Carlos Lacerda in order to promote some of his close associates such as his chief of the military household, Ernesto Geisel. The large number of promotions made by Castello Branco in the last six months of his presidency meant that fewer positions would become vacant during the presidency of Costa e Silva. To see if non-professional criteria still influence positions, the qualifications of fifteen new brigadier generals announced March 31, 1978 are analyzed in the tables below.⁵⁷

TABLE 4

	FEB	Hermes	ESG	AG	Personal Connections
generals promoted on 31 Mar 78 (15)	0 (0%)	2 (13%)	7 (47%)	5 (33%)	4 (27%)
all brigadier generals (76)	13 (17%)	11 (14%)	53 (70%)	11 (14%)	unk

TABLE 5

	FEB	Hermes	ESG	AG
new generals with personal connections (4)	0 (0%)	1 (25%)	1 (25%)	4 (100%)
new generals without personal connections (11)	0 (0%)	1 (9%)	6 (40%)	1 (7%)

FEB - a veteran of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force

Hermes - recipient of the Marshall Hermes medal - awarded for ranking first in at least one military school

ESG - graduate of one of the Superior War College level schools

AG - Agregado - a political/military assignment to a governmental agency, industry or the joint military staff; authorized in the 1967 Constitution

Table 4 compares certain professional qualifications of the most recently promoted brigadier generals with all brigadier generals. The fact that no veterans of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force were promoted reflects their dwindling numbers. Of the approximately 460 colonels on active duty, only 3% are veterans of the FEB. The academic performance of the new generals is comparable to all brigadiers as shown by the number who have received the Marshal Hermes medal. Fewer of the new generals have attended the ESG but no conclusions can be drawn because many officers attend the school after promotion to general. The number of agregados, or officers assigned to political or administrative duties, is significantly higher. Finally, over a fourth (four) of the new generals have personal links to either the current president or the next president.

Table 5 compares the professional qualifications of the four new generals with well known links to Geisel and Figueiredo to those of the new generals without those personal connections. It is apparent that those with personal connections have inferior professional qualifications as measured by attendance at the ESG and they have much greater

experience in political-type duties. From this one set of promotions during Geisel's presidency, it would appear that an officer's promotion chances are enhanced by political duties and by personal connections with a politico/military mentor. It is also worth noting that General Figueredo's brother was promoted to major general on the same date.

When the state fails to obtain the voluntary support of the military it can employ a variety of formal or informal sanctions against soldier dissidents to neutralize their opposition. The Brazilian state has utilized a number of these coercive measures for what might be termed political ends. The analytical difficulty is in determining when an administrative action is politically motivated and when it is simply the normal operation of the personnel management system. The most frequently used tool of coercion and the one most difficult to identify as politically motivated is the promotion system. As seen above, promotions to the higher ranks are extremely competitive, i.e., all the candidates for promotion are likely to have similar professional qualifications. Their eventual selection is often based on marginal differences from their peers or factors such as a personal relationship with a member of the High Command or political attitudes. The failure of dissidents to be promoted has not only neutralized them, but the threat of promotion passovers is a powerful disincentive to others.

Another "bloodless" method of neutralizing dissenters is by reassigning them to other military duties. This may mean the removal of the dissenter from a position of influence or power such as troop command and his reassignment to a safer duty, or it may mean his virtual exile to a remote post in the interior. In 1978 three officers received a great deal of notoriety by publicly condemning President Geisel's choice of a successor. One, a lieutenant colonel, was removed as a battalion

commander and was made the regional recruiting officer. Another was reassigned to Amazonia. The third, the chief of the president's military household, perhaps the most powerful political position for an active duty officer, was reassigned as the assistant to the Director of Military Personnel. Somewhat broader in scope was the sudden removal in 1977 of twenty officers from command positions following the purge of the Army Minister, under those circumstances clearly for reasons other than normal rotation.⁵⁸

The statutory disciplinary powers of military commanders are another source of political coercion. Under the army disciplinary codes and statutes, an officer may be subjected to a maximum punishment of thirty days under house arrest at the direction of his military superior. Any punishment in excess of that must be applied by an ad-hoc justification council or by the Superior Military Tribunal (STM).⁵⁹ In the cases of the three dissenting officers mentioned above, two were sentenced to the maximum thirty day house arrest; one was later sentenced to an additional twenty days. Since the objective of the punishment was to silence their outspoken complaints, it was preferable to employ a series of low level administrative sanctions rather than involve lengthy proceedings before special military tribunals which would merely prolong the publicity.

The harshest and most direct measures employed by the state to limit dissent are purges. Institutional Act (Ato Institucional, AI) Number One of April 9, 1964 empowered the revolutionary junta, known as the Supreme Command of the Revolution, to retire, dismiss, or transfer to the reserve any federal employee including military personnel "determined to be a threat against the security of the Nation, the democratic way of life, and honesty in public administration."⁶⁰ The regime used

this authority to undertake wholesale purges of those military officers who were closely identified with the Goulart administration or who failed to fall in behind the military government. This provision of AI-1 expired six months later so Castello Branco, under pressure from the hardliners, made his turn to the right and issued Institutional Act Number Two on October 27, 1965 which reiterated the president's dismissal powers and extended them indefinitely.

The Constitution of 1967 specified the power of the president to appoint and dismiss the army's principal commanders, but the power to deprive officers of their posts and commissions was given to permanent military courts in time of peace or to special courts in war time. The military court established for this purpose was the Superior Military Tribunal (STM), which had been created by AI-2 and included later in the Constitution. The STM was composed of fifteen judges: three of whom were to be selected from active Navy flag rank officers, four from active Army generals, three from active Air Force generals, and five from the civilian sector. Despite the seemingly definitive expression of dismissal powers contained in the constitution, the removal of military officers for political reasons continued to be exercised under the authority of exceptional decree laws. The authority for ideological purges since 1968 has resided in two more Institutional Acts which have linked political dissent with national security and military unity.

The best known of the repressive acts has been Institutional Act Number Five which was issued by President Costa e Silva on December 13, 1968. Of the twelve articles contained in it, Article 5 enabled the president to cancel electoral mandates and suspend an individual's political rights for a period of ten years. Under the terms of this article 454 elected officials were deprived of their political rights between

1968 and 1977. During the same period the mandates of 110 federal deputies, 161 state deputies, and 44 local officials were cancelled.⁶¹

While these effects of AI-5 are best known, less well-known are the provisions for sanctioning members of the military. Article 6 of the Act states, "Military personnel, or members of the Military Police, shall also be subject to dismissal, transfer to the reserve or retirement." From the date the Act was signed until it expired on January 1, 1978, 241 military personnel were punished under the terms of this article.⁶² This represents 15% of the total number of Brazilians (1577) subjected to it.

Institutional Act Number Five was directed at those the regime considered threats to national security as it was broadly defined. The next year another Institutional Act was issued which dealt solely with political threats from the ranks of the military. In the face of growing discontent among the junior and intermediate ranks over the presidential succession, the junta which governed during the incapacitation of Costa e Silva issued Institutional Act Number 17 on December 14, 1969. Article 1 of the Act stated,

The President of the Republic may transfer to the reserve, for a specified period, military personnel who plot against or attempt an action against the cohesion of the Armed Forces⁶³

AI-17, then, was directed not at any particular faction but at political dissent in general. It was a recognition of the threats to the regime posed by disunity in the army. The use of AI-17, as well as AI-5, was an extreme sanction to invoke since it required the personal intervention of the president. Much more preferable in many cases, were the internal administrative procedures of the army since they were relatively invisible to the public and the rest of the army and they were generally sufficient to silence the dissenters. Even more effective over the

fourteen years of military rule has been the strict socialization and dedication to the principles of hierarchy and unity which have diminished the need for coercive control.

NOTES

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⁵"Two Generals Differ on Support for Figueiredo," Agence France Presse (Paris), January 6, 1978.

⁶"Former 2d Army Chief Denies Torture Allegations," Jornal do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro), December 22, 1977, p. 4.

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⁸Eric Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp. 125-26.

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¹³Schneider, The Political System of Brazil, p. 260.

¹⁴Juan Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology (New York: The Free Press, 1970), pp. 251-83.

¹⁵Wayne A. Selcher, The National Security Doctrine and Policies of the Brazilian Government (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, July 15, 1977), p. 12.

¹⁶Amaral Gurgel, Segurança e Democracia (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora e Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1975), pp. 158-59, quoted in Selcher, The National Security Doctrine, p. 12.

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¹⁹"Brazil: End of a Beautiful Friendship," Latin America Political Report, March 11, 1977, pp. 73-74.

²⁰Personal interview with Brigadier General Celso Myer, Brazilian Military Attache to the United States, Washington, D.C., April 13, 1978.

²¹Personal interview with U.S. State Department official, May 21, 1979.

²²This view of the results of military professionalism in Latin America is seen in the works of Edwin Lieuwen and John J. Johnson. The most influential exponent of this view, although he has changed his view somewhat, was Samuel Huntington.

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²⁴Stepan, The Military in Politics, p. 154.

²⁵"Report of Cubans in Guyana No Surprise to Military," O Estado de São Paulo, November 19, 1977, p. 5.

²⁶"New Border Infantry Unit," O Estado de São Paulo, December 20, 1977, p. 16.

²⁷José Nun, "A Latin American Phenomenon: The Middle Class Military Coup" in James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, eds., Latin America: Reform or Revolution? (New York: Fawcett, 1968), pp. 145-85.

²⁸For example, John Saxe-Fernandez, "The Central American Defense Council and Pax Americana," in Irving Louis Horowitz, Josué de Castro, and John Gerassi, eds., Latin American Radicalism (New York: Random House, 1969), and more recently Michael T. Klare, Supplying Repression (New York: The Field Foundation, 1977), and publications of the North American Congress for Latin America (NACLA).

²⁹Data collected by the author from the 1977 Almanaque do Exército do Brasil.

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³¹Fernando Pedreira, Março 31: Cívís e Militares no Processo da Crise Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro, 1964), pp. 9-10, quoted in Schneider, The Political System of Brazil, p. 144.

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³³Donald E. Syvrud, Foundations of Brazilian Economic Growth (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1974) and Werner Baer, et al, "The Changing Role of the State in the Brazilian Economy" World Development, vol. 1, no. 11, November, 1973.

³⁴"Figuereido Interviewed on Amnesty, Rights" Jornal do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro), February 23, 1978, p. 4.

³⁵"Brazil: August Is a Wicked Month" Latin America Political Report, August 12, 1977, pp. 244-45.

³⁶Stepan, The Military in Politics, pp. 230-36.

³⁷The term Sorbonnist is widely applied to those who were closely associated with the founding and growth of the Superior War College in the 1950's. The term itself refers to their intellectual pretensions which earned the school the nickname of the Brazilian Sorbonne.

³⁸Schneider, The Political System of Brazil, pp. 358-59.

³⁹Stepan, The Military in Politics, pp. 240-41.

⁴⁰Schneider, The Political System of Brazil, pp. 254-57.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, pp. 255-57.

⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 218.

⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 108.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 170.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, p. 200.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 299-301.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p. 255.

⁴⁸"Spying Scapegoats" Latin America Political Report, November 18, 1977, pp. 356-57.

⁴⁹"Democratic Revolutionary Movement Discussed" Veja (São Paulo), October 26, 1977, pp. 22-23.

⁵⁰"Greens and Yellows See Red in Brazil" Latin America Political Report, November 18, 1977, p. 355.

⁵¹"Clash Looming" Latin America Political Report, May 20, 1977, p. 150.

⁵²"Do Not Pass Go" Latin America Political Report, April 22, 1977, pp. 114-16.

⁵³U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade 1963-1973 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 17-23.

⁵⁴Schneider, The Political System of Brazil, p. 260.

⁵⁵"Military Promotion Role of High Command Surveyed" O Estado de São Paulo, November 23, 1977, p. 4.

⁵⁶Schneider, The Political System of Brazil, pp. 210-11.

⁵⁷Personal data on the newly promoted generals is found in O Estado de São Paulo, April 2, 1978. Additional data was obtained from the 1977 Brazilian Army Almanaque.

⁵⁸Latin America Political Report, November 4, 1977, p. 344.

⁵⁹Walder de Góes, "Government Considering Punishment of Military Dissidents," Jornal do Brasil, May 21, 1978, p. 4.

⁶⁰The texts of Institutional Acts One through Five are found in E. Bradford Burns, A History of Brazil (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 390-413.

⁶¹"Sem Choro Nem Vela" Veja (São Paulo), December 13, 1978, pp. 24-29.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³The text of Institutional Act Number Seventeen is found in Eliezer R. de Oliveira, As Forças Armadas: Política e Ideologia no Brasil (1964-1969) (Petropolis, Brazil: Editora Vozes Ltda, 1976), p. 129.

III. CENTRALIZATION AND CONTROL

The preceding chapter dealt with the internal cohesion of the military and its importance to the viability of the regime. When that unity and support were threatened we saw the formal and informal powers available to the state to maintain unity and discipline within the military. These powers were usually intended for non-political purposes, but the state has been able to manipulate them to control political dissent and create support within the military. Although these powers have been used by faction against faction, they are directed at individuals.

The Brazilian state's strategies of political control have extended beyond measures directed against individuals, cliques, or factions, however. Since 1964, it has reorganized the state structure and restructured the relationships between the various components to increase its own strength and dominance. These changes have not been directed at any individual or faction but at the overall organization of the state. While the preceding chapter dealt with relations between the state and individuals in the military, this chapter deals with relations between the state and the military institutions. We will examine the strategies used by the state to establish more thorough organizational and structural control over the military by reviewing the trend toward increasing centralization evident since 1964.

The State Militias

Throughout its history Brazil has had a strong tradition of federalism. Originating in the autonomy of the hereditary captaincies, the

political strength of the states and the weaknesses of the central government have been reflected in Brazilian political institutions until recently. Brazilian politics since the days of the Marques de Pombal in the eighteenth century can be viewed as a struggle between the central government seeking to increase its strength and the states seeking to maintain their relative independence. In the early years of Independence, the power of the provinces was formally recognized and turned into military capability. In 1831, the Brazilian emperor authorized the states to establish permanent forces called the Municipal Corps to maintain internal order.¹

Under the monarchy, these small, ill-equipped, and poorly-trained forces were used for little more than maintaining local order and apprehending runaway slaves. Upon the proclamation of the Republic, the federal system adopted by the central government naturally encouraged the strengthening of the old provincial (now state) militias. The militias under this system were recruited locally, under the command of the state governor, and the stronger and better trained of them became increasingly used for political purposes.² Since the militias often outnumbered federal troops stationed there, they were also used to maintain the independence of the state and the federal system from federal government encroachment. The existence and power of the state militias was thus both cause and consequence of the power of the individual states.

The inauguration of the Estado Novo in 1937 was a watershed in this struggle for dominance in that the militias and the states began a long-term decline in their power. The corporatist structures of the Estado Novo imposed a centralization and control of the militias that was strongly resisted and not completely successful. The example of the São Paulo militia, the Força Pública, is illustrative.³ The Força

Pública has been the strongest and most politically involved of the state militias because of the power and wealth of São Paulo and its traditional competition with Rio de Janeiro, the old federal capital. In the days of the Old Republic, the Força Pública was trained by a resident French military mission from 1906-1914, developed its own air force, and outnumbered federal troops in the state by a ratio of ten to one.

During the Estado Novo, Getulio Vargas made numerous attempts to demilitarize the Força Pública but was not totally successful. The strength of the Força Pública is seen in its growth over the years. Its strength grew slowly during the monarchy; then between Independence and 1930 it grew rapidly to 6,000 men. During the Estado Novo its strength fluctuated between 6,000 and 10,000 men. From 1945-1964, it ballooned in size from 11,750 to 31,000. In 1964 it played a major role in the overthrow of Goulart when it threw its support to the coup plotters and influenced the state governor, Adhemar de Barros, and the federal military units to do the same. But when Barros was removed from office by decree in 1966, the militia did not come to his aid. The new governor, Laudo Natel, sought to gain its support by increasing the members' salaries and the authorized strength to 36,000. He was the first governor to have an active army officer in formal command of the entire force. That officer was then Colonel João Figueiredo.⁴

The long-term efforts of the federal government to gain effective control over the state militias reached a climax during the presidencies of Castello Branco and Costa e Silva. Article 13 of the 1967 Brazilian constitution states that

the military police, instituted for the maintenance of order and internal security in the states, the territories, and the Federal District . . . are considered auxiliary forces and reserves of the Army . . .

This constitutional federal control was effectively implemented on July 2, 1969 when Costa e Silva signed Decree Law 667 federalizing all state militias. Under the terms of this decree, the militias, now known as the Military Police, were controlled locally by the state's internal security agency and these were placed under the command of an active army officer. The chain of command was drawn so that, despite the titular command of the state governor, they were effectively commanded by an army officer who was responsive to the Army Minister.⁵

The Military Police were to be supervised by a newly created office on the Army General Staff, the Inspector General of Military Police. It is worth recalling that the current president, João Figueredo, has personal experience in the federal supervision of local police since he served as chief of police of São Paulo during the presidency of Castello Branco. The military regime thus succeeded in imposing a unified command structure which centralized all military and police functions. Although the various agencies and departments retained their own separate identities, the lines of command authority and the personal control of active army commanders would ensure that not only would these forces refrain from political mischief, but they would become an integral arm of federal control.

The Intelligence Apparatus

The most notorious if not the most visible characteristic of the Brazilian state and the one which best defines its authoritarian character is the strength and political significance of its intelligence apparatus. Foreign observers from Amnesty International to the U.S. Congress as well as domestic critics with sufficient immunity have complained of the extensive surveillance and harsh repressive measures undertaken by

it. These functions represent the other side of the corporatist coin. When administrative control through the corporatist structures fails, the state can employ more overt, even physical, means of control. Better yet, an efficient surveillance system can identify dissidents and initiate timely action before they can threaten the system.

The Brazilian intelligence apparatus which is referred to is in reality a number of agencies with similar and often overlapping responsibilities. It has grown since 1964 as a result of the aspirations of the military elite and as a response to the rise of militant civilian opposition and urban terrorism during the presidencies of Costa e Silva and Médici. Its growth has occurred through the centralization and strengthening of the existing agencies and at the same time the creation of new structures and elements of supervision and control. The next few paragraphs will describe the various agencies which have been given or have assumed for themselves intelligence functions and the efforts by the state to establish and maintain centralized control over them.

The primary intelligence arm of the federal government is the National Intelligence Service (Serviço Nacional de Informações, SNI). The Sorbonnists associated with the ESG felt the need for a centralized, national intelligence agency and, following the '64 coup, wasted no time in creating one.⁶ The SNI was organized in the early months of the Castello Branco presidency by General Golbery do Couto e Silva and played a large role in the civilian cassations and military purges in the following years. The charter of the SNI is contained in Decree Law 200 issued by Castello Branco on February 25, 1967. One of the flood of decrees in the last weeks of Castello Branco's regime, it reorganized the federal bureaucracy and Article 44 stated that the function of the SNI was to ". . . supervise and cordinate, in all the national territory,

the intelligence and counter-intelligence activities, in particular those which concern the national security."⁷ Within the framework envisioned, the SNI is the umbrella organization for all intelligence activities, the head of the National Intelligence System (SISNI).

The SNI divides its responsibilities as an intelligence gathering and evaluation agency into four functional areas: political, economic, psychological/social, and military.⁸ Raw information on these topics is filtered upward through the reporting system from SNI agents in the field or from agents of other intelligence activities or informants. The SNI itself is not as pervasive as its influence would indicate since it depends on input from the other agencies. Its own structure consists of the Central Agency, which is the executive agency located in Brasilia, and offices in the capitals of the major states. The smaller states do not have SNI offices located in them but the SNI maintains close links with other agencies there and in particular with the state's Secretary of Public Safety who is charged with responsibility for the state's internal security.

An organization with the political impact of the SNI can easily elevate its officials and especially its chief to political significance. The table below lists the chiefs of the SNI since its founding in 1964. All were Army generals and, except for General Golbery who retired in 1961, all were on active duty. The political power of the position is easily demonstrated by the fact that two, Médici and Figueiredo, moved from the SNI to the presidency, and one, Golbery, has been the most intimate advisor to one president and chief of the civil household to two. General Fontoura, although he has not played as significant a role in domestic politics, became Brazilian ambassador to Portugal, a position with more prestige than power, somewhat comparable with the U.S.

ambassador to the Court of St. James. It should be recognized that these chiefs have not been professional intelligence agents or executives. Unlike the U.S. Army, the Brazilian army does not have a separate Military Intelligence branch to which an officer is assigned for career management purposes. These chiefs as well as an undetermined number of other army officers are detailed to the SNI for a tour of duty as in any other military assignment.

TABLE 6

CHIEFS OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SNI)

Chief	Dates	Subsequent assignments
Gen. Golbery do Couto e Silva	1964-67	Chief of civil household to Geisel & Figueiredo
Gen. Emilio Garrastazu Médici	1967-69	President
Gen. Carlos Alberto Fontoura	1969-74	Ambassador to Portugal
Gen. João Baptista Figueiredo	1974-78	President
Gen. Otávio Aguiar de Medeiros	1978-	

SOURCE: Veja, May 17, 1978

Among the agencies that the SNI relies on for intelligence information are the Intelligence and Security Divisions (DSI's) and Intelligence and Security Offices (ASI's) located throughout the federal bureaucracy. Established by Article 29 of Decree Law 200, DSI's are located in each of the civilian ministries of the federal government and the ASI's are located in each ministerial division and subordinate organization to include state industries and autonomous agencies. Although closely linked to the SNI, these agencies are formally autonomous and under the direct control of the minister or agency chief. Nevertheless, as an integral part of the National Intelligence System they respond to requests from the SNI and provide information to it.⁹

The third civilian agency of the federal government with an

intelligence function is the Department of Federal Police (DPF). Within the DPF the subsection dealing with intelligence is the Division of Political and Social Order (DOPS). Established by the 1967 constitution and a decree law issued by President Médici in June, 1972, DOPS is concerned with the "national security, the political and social order or property, services, interests of the union, as well as other infractions having international repercussions." There are DOPS offices in Brasilia and all but the least populous and least important states.¹⁰

Despite the centralization of police and intelligence functions, state and local forces also have intelligence functions. The state military police, discussed earlier, consist of 175,000 men in all the states and are charged with maintaining the states' internal security. With their military organization, training, weaponry and formal command by an army officer they resemble an army more than a police force. The state civil police are under the command of the state's Secretary of Public Safety and total 50,000 men in all. In each state the Secretary has an office dealing with political and social order, the State Division of Political and Social Order (DEOPS).¹¹ Under the National Intelligence System, these organizations in each state are linked to the SNI through established channels of communication and coordination.

All three military services conduct intelligence activities. The army has been most deeply involved because of the dominance of the army in the post-64 regime and because of its responsibilities in the campaign against terrorism. All military units battalion-sized and larger have staff sections devoted to intelligence activities. Each of the Brazilian services has a central organization at the national level responsible for counter-intelligence activities within its own branch of service. They are known by their acronyms: CENIMAR (Centro de Informações da Marinha/

Navy Intelligence Center), CISA (Centro de Informações da Aeronáutica/Air Force Intelligence Center) and CIEX (Centro de Informações do Exército/Army Intelligence Center). CIEX was organized in 1969 by President Costa e Silva and is directly subordinate to the Minister of the Army (Appendix 3). It was intimately involved in the army's anti-subversive campaigns and was further responsible for monitoring and investigating dissidence within the army.

While the SNI is the titular head of the National Intelligence System, the several operational agencies have frequently operated autonomously and at times in near conflict with one another. The proliferation of civilian and military intelligence agencies has led to problems of coordination and control which have been further compounded by differences in tactics and bureaucratic and inter-service rivalries. The Brazilian state has created several agencies whose purpose it is to coordinate the activities of the many arms of the apparatus and insure their subordination to the president. At the national level, the National Security Council is responsible for planning and supervising all activities dealing with national security. Although it existed prior to 1964, it was reorganized by Decree Law 348 issued on January 4, 1968 by Costa e Silva, which had the effect of increasing military influence in it and further subordinating it to presidential control. By that decree the chief of the president's military household, his appointee and ex officio secretary general of the National Security Council, was raised to cabinet member status and the number of military men were increased to a majority on the Council.¹²

Also at the national level but somewhat later, steps were taken to professionalize the training of intelligence agents and managers. In 1971 the National Intelligence School (ESNI) was founded in order to

develop a uniform intelligence doctrine and to raise the level of training within the intelligence agencies.¹³ While the selection and training of agents at ESNI is closely guarded, one can piece together some information from unclassified sources. The weakness imposed by the military services' frequent personnel reassignments highlighted the need for a permanent corps of intelligence specialists. While the services have provided personnel to man the SNI in the past, it appears that the SNI now recruits its own trainees which then attend a training program at ESNI. All the national agencies send their intelligence personnel to ESNI for training. All that is known about the training is that it is presented in three formal courses known cryptically as course A, course B, and course C. The chart below provides some data on army officers who have received this training.

TABLE 7
ARMY GRADUATES OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL (ESNI)
(as of 31 Dec 1976)

Rank	Course			Total
	"A"	"B"	"C"	
Colonel	11	1		12
Lieutenant colonel	23	22		45
Major	1	33	1	35
Captain		16	39	55
Lieutenant			4	4
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>72</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>151</u>

SOURCE: Almanaque do Exército: 1977.

It appears that the three courses are differentiated by their level of responsibility. Thus course "C" is designed for junior officers, generally captain and probably deals with the basic, "hands on" level of intelligence collection and analysis. Courses "B" and "A", apparently designed for middle and senior grade officers, probably deal

increasingly with planning, management and supervision of the intelligence process. Extrapolations and speculation based on such limited data are risky but the data illustrate the systematic and centralized training conducted by ESNI for all components of the intelligence apparatus. An analysis of the military qualifications of the army graduates of ESNI (branch of service and career success as shown by promotions for merit) indicates that this group is representative of the army as a whole. Thus, the method of selecting SNI agents by personal evaluation and invitation is probably true for army selectees also, although it is possible that the group's representativeness is insured by a system of quotas.

The National Security Council and the National Intelligence School are designed to insure that intelligence and internal security strategies are uniform and coordinated at the highest levels of government. Another agency is charged with insuring this coordination at lower levels. In 1969 an agency known as the Detachment of Integrated Operations - Center for Internal Defense Operations (DOI-CODI) was organized in each of the geographical Army Headquarters (Appendix 2). The DOI-CODI is essentially an ad hoc organization whose function is to coordinate the anti-subversive activities of the local, state, and federal intelligence agencies as well as the army, navy and air force. The DOI-CODI in each army command is composed of representatives of each of these agencies and is under the overall command of the senior army commander.¹⁴ Thus, the proliferation of intelligence agencies is theoretically unified at the regional level by the DOI-CODI and subordinated to the control of the president through the army chain of command.

For over a year the Brazilian press has carried reports and revelations about the death in 1975 of a well-known journalist, Vladimir Herzog. These reports have revealed a great deal about the internal

functioning and the strength of government control over the intelligence apparatus. In August, 1975 the body of a lieutenant of the Military Police was found in the II Army (São Paulo) headquarters of DOI-CODI. In October of 1975, the body of Vladimir Herzog was discovered and officially announced to be suicide. President Geisel then traveled to São Paulo and visited General Ednardo D'Avila Melo, commander of the II Army and in formal command of the DOI-CODI there. Geisel impressed on him the political sensitivity of such deaths, whether murder or suicide, and demanded that he insure that no more occur.

Then three months later, on January 17, 1976, news of the death of a laborer in the II Army DOI-CODI reached Geisel. Two days later, in spite of the strong opposition of the Minister of the Army, the commanders of the III and IV Armies and several other members of the High Command, Geisel abruptly fired General Ednardo and replaced him with a long-time friend General Dilermando Gomes.¹⁵ It is doubtful that General Ednardo approved or was more than vaguely aware of the interrogation techniques which apparently led to these three deaths. Nevertheless, President Geisel's swift action against the four-star general formally in charge firmly reestablished the Army commander's responsibility for DOI-CODI activities and surely resulted in restrictions on their activities in the other commands also.

NOTES

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³Ibid., pp. 84-108.

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⁵U.S. Army, Area Handbook for Brazil (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 377.

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¹⁰U.S. Army, Area Handbook for Brazil, p. 376.

¹¹Ibid., p. 377.

¹²Schneider, The Political System of Brazil, pp. 237-38.

¹³"O SNI no Contra-Ataque" Veja (São Paulo), May 17, 1978, p. 54.

¹⁴U.S. Army, Area Handbook for Brazil, p. 386.

¹⁵"A Queda do Vice-Rei" Veja (São Paulo), March 14, 1978, pp. 53-54.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The 1979 Presidential Succession

Throughout the fourteen years of military rule, military unity has been most fragile during the selection of the next president. Succession has been the litmus test of army factions. Brazil has recently undergone another of these periodic struggles which has differed significantly from the previous ones. Events from this selection process have been used to illustrate the previous chapters but here it would be worthwhile to briefly examine the novel process by which President Geisel selected General João Figueiredo. A review of this past succession can shed light on the current divisions within the army and on the current relationship between the military institution and the Brazilian state.

President Geisel apparently developed a plan for an orderly succession early on in his presidency. As chief of the military household under Castello Branco, he was involved in Castello's search for a civilian successor. He then saw Castello's plan for redemocratization collapse when War Minister Costa e Silva insisted that seniority of rank be followed and that he himself be the next president. Several years later he saw the army High Command "elect" the president. Geisel realized that his policies would have continuity only if he controlled the succession.¹ The president's plan included a package of political reforms issued in April of 1977 which cancelled the upcoming direct elections and made them indirect to insure the victory of the official government party. With regard to the presidency, he declared that there would be no politicking

or discussion of presidential candidates until January, 1978. Until then, he would conduct soundings of opinion within the various sectors in the country: military, business, government, church, etc. In January he would then announce his recommendation to the nation.

The president's plan began to collapse in the summer of 1977 as the various factions and ambitious generals began jockeying for advantage. The candidate of the hard-line faction in the army, General Silvio Frota, then Army Minister, had been the choice of that faction since he assumed the ministry in 1974. His followers in the army and in congress began a well orchestrated campaign to push his candidacy. The directors of the campaign were retired General Jayme Portella, chief of the military household under Costa e Silva, the general secretary of the army ministry, and the head of the army intelligence center, the latter two directly responsible to the Army Minister in their official duties.² The candidate of the Sorbonnist faction was General João Figueiredo, then head of the National Intelligence Service (SNI). His supporters launched his campaign in a none too subtle fashion with the public announcement of his candidacy by none other than President Geisel's adopted son and former press secretary, Humberto Barreto, in July. Barreto was reprimanded for his action and Figueiredo was embarrassed but the trial balloon may have prevented a *fait accompli* by the Frotistas. Additionally, several other splinter factions, the MMDC, MRD, MPDR, identified themselves and added their opinions to the now near-public debate. Geisel came to realize that he was about to lose control of the selection and upon the urging of his brother, a former Army Minister, decided to act.³

Geisel, who is a very reserved and almost secretive individual, decided to fire General Frota, and he developed an elaborate plan which was designed to minimize any hostile reaction from Frota or his army

supporters. On a holiday when most of the High Command and all of Frota's supporters were out of the capital, Geisel summoned him to his office and brusquely fired him. Geisel had earlier ordered all of the members of the high command to Brasília and directed them to report directly to his office. He further placed airborne units in Rio on alert. Frota attempted to convene the High Command but they had been pre-empted by Geisel's summons. In all, Geisel showed himself to be an able political tactician, at least on this occasion.⁴

Geisel immediately began to clean house. That same day he swore in General Belfort Bethlem to replace Frota and also fired the two generals who had directed his campaign from within the army ministry. Within a month reports surfaced that the new Army Minister was reassigning up to forty-seven lieutenant colonels and colonels in command of troops.⁵ Although General Bethlem claimed they were normal reassignments, it was reported that at least one of those relieved, the commander of the presidential guard battalion, had remained loyal to General Frota during the confrontation. There remained a great deal of disgruntlement among Frota supporters, but Geisel had succeeded in re-establishing control over his succession. The first week of January he announced publicly his choice of General Figueredo.

Throughout the selection process, the army High Command was permitted no role. Unlike the 1969 "election" when the High Command selected Médici and the other successions when its collective opinion was at least sought out, this time it was not even consulted. Geisel succeeded in retaining total authority himself. The establishment of this new precedent offended many officers besides the strong Frota supporters. Within a month, however, most of the members of the High Command had publicly expressed support for the Figueredo candidacy and it appeared that

the remainder of the army was marching to the tune of military unity and supporting the president.

Many dissident officers continued to protest the selection and sought ways to contest it effectively. The chief of Geisel's military household, General Hugo Abreu, resigned in protest and became the spokesman for the dissidents. Many of Abreu's activities were covert since several laws and military regulations were available to the president to silence him. Negotiations between the MDB and the military dissidents led to the nomination of General Euler Bentes Monteiro as candidate of the MDB in the October indirect election.

General Euler's background provides interesting insights into the qualifications required by a serious presidential candidate in Brazil. In 1977 he was the most senior four-star general on active duty and therefore his candidacy appealed to those who felt Geisel's nomination of a three-star general was a violation of army hierarchy. During his military career he had been awarded the Marshall Hermes medal twice for finishing first in his class in two military schools, eclipsed by Figueiredo's three awards but still impressive. He succeeded Celso Furtado as head of the northeast development agency, SUDENE, and resigned in 1969 when his close associate, the hard-line Minister of the Interior, General Albuquerque Lima was forced from Costa e Silva's cabinet.⁶ He was also a close associate of President Geisel's Minister of Trade and Industry, Severo Gomes, who was fired in 1977 for his too energetic calls for a return to democracy and his support of native business interests.⁷ These credentials enabled General Euler to appeal to a broader spectrum within the military than just the ideologically committed hard-liners.

As the candidate of the MDB, the government approved opposition party, General Euler became the hope of the more liberal civilian

opposition, the military dissidents who desired a more rapid return to democracy, and the hard-line military upset at their loss of influence in the government. This unlikely coalition was little more than a marriage of convenience for all its elements. Apparently, no consideration was given to the potential for conflict should General Euler win the election. That concern, and the difficulties such a diverse grouping would have in governing were overcome by the breathtaking thought of victory.

This brief narrative highlights some recent and some long-term trends in the regime and in the support it receives from the army. The first trend is an apparent movement toward more open dissent within the military. Severe administrative sanctions can still be employed when an individual goes too far in his criticisms, but more officers appear willing to take that risk. The open question is whether this outspokenness is due to more intense dissension or because President Geisel's policy of "relaxation" has even been extended to the military. There also appears to be increasing fragmentation among military opinion. The historical split between the Sorbonnists and the hard-liners is still present but military unity is now complicated by several other factions which have their own particular platforms. Since the Médici administration there has occurred a general lessening of the subversive threat that has perhaps reduced one source of unity and encouraged wider expression of opinion. Today the critical issue is a return to democracy. Indeed, all factions profess to desire a return to democracy. The difference, of course, is in their definition of democracy and the speed with which the government should move in that direction. As one wag put it, in Brazil democracy is a form of government with three branches: the army, the navy and the air force.⁸

Regarding the historical military factions, it appears that the Sorbonnists, although lineal descendants of Castello Branco and his moderates, have become more in-grown and insulated from the mainstream and now constitute an elite within the elite or a self-perpetuating oligarchy. The hard-liners are upset at their loss of influence and are mostly concerned with regaining it. Their alliance with the army liberals and the MDB has been for their own purposes and not out of any real desire for civilian rule. Geisel and Figueiredo may be unlikely democrats but, given the choice between the SNI clique and a hard-line supported MDB candidate, they may be the best and most likely hope for an eventual return to a civilian democracy.

One of the most significant trends has been the all but complete depoliticization of the army High Command. Formerly the true kingmaker, it has gradually been reduced, first to an advisory body on presidential succession, and now virtually excluded from the process. Equally significant is the fact that presidential success in excluding the High Command from a role in succession, may have gained the president the stature and power to exclude the command from other political matters. This growth of presidential power and independence indicate a strengthening of the presidency at the expense of the army. Other evidence of his independence of army demands has been his disregard of the recommendations of the military pay commission. When the commission recommended pay increases to keep up with inflation, Geisel arbitrarily cut the recommended increases substantially.⁹ Manwaring has shown that there is a long-term trend toward greater longevity in office of cabinet appointees.¹⁰ While the composition of Médici's cabinet was carefully balanced among the factions, this trend could indicate that the presidents are increasingly able to select cabinet officers with which they personally can work,

rather than to satisfy the various military and civilian factions. Finally, Geisel's selection of a relatively junior three-star general for president shows that the office is no longer the final promotion in a successful military career. Although Figueiredo has since been promoted to four-star general, this promotion was not at all certain when Geisel selected him.

Despite the cohesive forces of the military institutions, the powers of the state to maintain unity, and the growth and centralization of state power, military dissidence continues unabated over the issue of succession. This is the unavoidable consequence of the contradiction inherent in the Brazilian system: the state needs the political support of the military at the same time that it seeks to exclude it from politics. Unless and until the state succeeds in developing a base of support outside the military, it must continue to permit the military a political role. In the 1979 succession, President Geisel insisted that it be a passive and loyal supporter of the president, but this "non-role" was not accepted impassively by many in the military. By excluding the military from the succession process, Geisel won a tactical victory which was significant for future state-military relations in Brazil. How significant will not be known until 1985 when President Figueiredo passes the presidency to his successor. The 1979 succession will then be known as either a landmark in the growth of state dominance over the military or merely the fourth in a series of novel solutions to the succession problem.

In Lieu of a Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis was to demonstrate the ways in which the Brazilian military has been progressively subordinated to the state.

I described a dual strategy of control by which the state sought to control the individual soldier and at the same time the military institution. We saw how the psychological characteristics of soldiers and the institutional characteristics of the military have been used by the state to keep soldiers united, and we saw how the state's many administrative powers have been used to keep them loyal to their leadership. Then we saw how this control was institutionalized by restructuring the relationship between the state and the military institution by centralizing and consolidating its organizational control. To provide a framework for the discussion, it was felt that the recent literature on the state in Latin America would provide a perspective which could elevate the discussion from the level of intergovernmental relations and bureaucratic politics. However, this perspective at times has appeared to be a "gratuitous confusion."¹¹

It is appropriate, and necessary, to end on the note on which we began: by addressing the role and concept of the state. Part of the problem with the term is our loose usage of it. It is a vague and amorphous word that carries with it the baggage of centuries. In spite of the broad definition used here, its more common usage is as a synonym with government. This is largely because the government is the political arm of the state and we seldom use the term state in any but a political context. Furthermore, our experiences in a democratic regime inhibit a clearer perception of the state. The narrower use of the term (state as government) is natural in a democracy where there are strict limitations on the state's power and concepts of popular sovereignty.

The concept of the state may be more at home in an authoritarian regime. The broader definition of the term is natural in the organic state described by Stepan. Here the state is the sum of a number of

interlocking and hierarchically ordered sectors of society. Among the sectors that comprise the organic state are the military, the church, business, labor, and the bureaucracy. These have considerable independence and autonomy within their sectors but are subject to the centralized control of a "neutral sovereign who resolves emergent disputes between corporations."¹² Who is this neutral sovereign? In Brazil's case it is the executive. Lest we begin to see the Brazilian president as a Louis XIV figure ("O Estado, sou eu!"), let us say that he represents the state, that is, the entire system, the sistema as the Brazilians like to call it. The tensions between the Brazilian state and the military described in this thesis can then be seen as the outcome of differing views on the role of the military in the state. Elements of the military have been seeking a larger role while the state, represented by the executive, has been seeking to reduce its political role.

The limitations of this perspective have been amply demonstrated here and unfortunately the benefits only hinted at. No short paper is going to impose a rigor on such slippery terms so much confusion remains. I am convinced, however, that there is a utility to the statist perspective and that it illuminates the recent role of the military in Brazil and can do the same in other Latin American authoritarian regimes.

NOTES

¹"Depoliticizing the High Command Seen as Consummated Fact" O Estado de São Paulo, January 22, 1978, p. 5.

²"Latin Letter," Latin America Political Report, October 21, 1977, p. 323.

³"Depoliticizing of High Command Seen as Consummated Fact," O Estado de São Paulo, January 22, 1978, p. 5.

⁴"Twelve Decisive Hours Preceding Frota's Dismissal Detailed," O Estado de São Paulo, November 6, 1977, p. 4.

⁵"Week's Military Command Changes Summarized," O Estado de São Paulo, November 9, 1977, p. 6.

⁶Schneider, The Political System of Brazil, p. 284.

⁷"Dropping the Gadfly," Latin America Political Report, February 11, 1977, p. 41.

⁸"Latin Letter," Latin America Political Report, September 23, 1977, p. 291.

⁹"Military 'Disappointed' at Wage Increase," O Estado de São Paulo, February 17, 1979, p. 6.

¹⁰Manwaring, "Career Patterns and Attitudes," pp. 20-25.

¹¹The phrase is from Sabine, Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, p. 328.

¹²Philippe C. Schmitter, "The 'Portugalization' of Brazil" in Alfred Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 219.

APPENDIX 1


Glossary of Acronyms and Abbreviations

- AI - Ato Institucional - Institutional Act. Decree issued by the president or junta suspending or modifying provisions of the constitution.
- AG - Agregado - Attached. The status of "a member of the armed forces on active duty who is appointed to any temporary, civilian, non-elective public position, including a position with an autonomous agency." Established by Article VI of the 1967 Constitution.
- AMAN - Academia Militar de Agulhas Negras - The Military Academy at Agulhas Negras. Located at Resende, Rio de Janeiro.
- ARENA - Alianza Renovadora Nacional - National Renovating Alliance. The government sponsored majority political party established by AI-2 and several subsequent Complementary Acts.
- ASI - Assessorias de Segurança e Informações - Intelligence and Security Offices
- CENIMAR - Centro de Informações da Marinha - Navy Intelligence Center
- CIEX - Centro de Informações do Exército - Army Intelligence Center
- CISA - Centro de Informações da Aeronáutica - Air Force Intelligence Center
- C/S - Chief of Staff
- CSN - Conselho de Segurança Nacional - National Security Council
- DEOPS - Delegacia Estadual da Ordem Política e Social - State Division of Political and Social Order. The intelligence agency of the individual states supervised by the state's Director of Public Safety.
- DOI - Director of Instruction. The army staff officer responsible for training and education.
- DOI-CODI - Destacamento de Operações Integradas - Centro de Operações de Defesa Interna - Detachment of Integrated Operations - Center for Internal Defense Operations. Agency in each major army area under the supervision of the army general in command whose function is to co-ordinate the anti-subversive activities of all intelligence agencies.

- DOPS** - Delegacia da Ordem Política e Social - Division of Political and Social Order. Intelligence agency within the Federal Police Department (DPF).
- DPF** - Departamento de Polícia Federal - Federal Police Department.
- DSI** - Divisões de Segurança e Informações - Intelligence and Security Divisions
- EMFA** - Estado Maior das Forças Armadas - Armed Forces General Staff.
- ECEME** - Escola de Comando e Estado Maior do Exército - Army Command and General Staff School. Three-year long school for selected army majors and lieutenant colonels.
- EsAO** - Escola de Aperfeiçoamento de Oficiais - Officer's Improvement School. Nine-month long school for army captains.
- ESG** - Escola Superior de Guerra - Superior War College. Year-long school for selected army colonels and generals and civilians.
- EsNI** - Escola Nacional de Informações - National Intelligence School.
- FEB** - Força Expedicionária Brasileira - Brazilian Expeditionary Force. Brazilian Division which participated in the Italian Campaign with the Allies during World War II. Febista - a veteran of the FEB.
- G2** - Army staff officer or section responsible for intelligence and counter-intelligence.
- G3** - Army staff officer or section responsible for operations and training.
- MDB** - Movimento Democrático Brasileiro - Brazilian Democratic Movement. Government recognized opposition or minority party.
- MMDC** - Movimento Militar Democrático Constitucionalista - Military Democratic Constitutionalist Movement.
- MPDR** - Movimento para a Defesa da Revolução - Movement for the Defense of the Revolution.
- MR** - Military Region
- MRD** - Movimento Revolucionário Democrático - Democratic Revolutionary Movement.
- PETROBRAS** - Petroleos Brasileiros - The Brazilian state oil monopoly
- SISNI** - Sistema Nacional de Informações - National Intelligence System.
- SNI** - Serviço Nacional de Informações - National Intelligence Service
- STM** - Superior Tribunal Militar - Supreme Military Tribunal. The highest military court.

APPENDIX 2

TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY



Headquarters

Rio de Janeiro
 São Paulo
 Porto Alegre
 Recife
 Manaus
 Brasília

Military Regions

I ARMY
 II ARMY
 III ARMY
 IV ARMY
 AMAZON MILITARY
 COMMAND
 PLANALTO MILITARY
 COMMAND


1st	4th
2nd	9th
3rd	5th
6th	7th
10th	
8th	12th
11th	

SOURCE: This is the Brazilian Army

APPENDIX 3: ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY

CHAIN OF COMMAND

*Denotes member of High Command
 **Denotes member of High Command
 but without voting rights



SOURCE: This is the Brazilian Army

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